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Abstract
This paper studies the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy on GDP, prices and
interest rates in 5 OECD countries, using a structural Vector Autore-
gression approach. Its main results can be summarized as follows: 1)
The estimated eﬀects of ﬁscal policy on GDP tend to be small: pos-
itive government spending multipliers larger than 1 tend to be the
exception; 2) The eﬀects of ﬁscal policy on GDP and its components
have become substantially weaker over time; 3) Under plausible values
of the price elasticity, government spending has positive eﬀects on the
price level, although usually small; 4) Government spending shocks
have signiﬁcant eﬀects on the nominal and real short interest rate,
but of varying signs; 5) In the post-1980 period, net tax shocks have
positive short run eﬀects on the nominal interest rate, and typically
negative or zero eﬀects on prices; 6) The US is an outlier in many
dimensions; responses to ﬁscal shocks estimated on US data are of-
ten not representative of the average OECD country included in this
sample.
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1 Introduction
While most economists would agree that an exogenous 10 percent increase
in money supply will lead to some increase in prices after a while, perfectly
reasonable economists can and do disagree even on the sign of the response of
private consumption or private investment to an exogenous shock to govern-
ment purchases of goods. Yet, there is no doubt that many more resources
have been devoted to the study of monetary policy than ﬁscal policy; only
recently has a small but growing literature emerged that applies to ﬁscal
policy time series methods that have long been standard in the analysis of
monetary policy.1
One reason why relatively little empirical work has been done on the
eﬀects of ﬁscal policy is probably the diﬃculty in assembling the necessary
data at high enough frequency and over suﬃciently long periods. In this
paper, I present evidence on the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy in ﬁve countries for
which I was able to assemble suﬃciently detailed quarterly data on the budget
of the general government: the US, West Germany, the UK, Canada, and
Australia. I do so using an approach originally developed in Blanchard and
Perotti [2002]: in essence, the method exploits institutional features of ﬁscal
policymaking and detailed information on the automatic eﬀects of GDP and
inﬂation on tax revenues and government spending to identify the exogenous
ﬁscal policy shocks in a structural vector autoregression.
Beside including more countries, this paper extends the methodology of
Blanchard and Perotti [2002] to study the interaction of ﬁscal and monetary
policy, and the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy on prices. Recent developments both
in the theory and in the practice of monetary policy have also emphasized
the link between ﬁscal and monetary policy. At the policy level, many of
the institutional provisions of the EMU have been rationalized in terms of
constraints on ﬁscal policy to enable monetary policy to achieve its mandate
1I review this literature in the next section. Almost all the recent empirical literature
refers to the United States.The exceptions known to me are Favero [2002] and Marcellino
[2002], who estimate ﬁscal policy VARs using half-yearly data from four European coun-
tries: France, Italy, Spain, and Germany.
1of price stability. And several policy measures, like the EU Council of Min-
isters’s reprimand against Ireland in February 2001, have been motivated by
the alleged aﬀects of speciﬁc ﬁscal policy actions on inﬂation and interest
rates. At the academic level, research on the Taylor rule has inevitably run
into the issue of how ﬁscal policy might interfere with interest rate control
(see Taylor [1996], Taylor [2000], and Woodford [1999]); more generally, the
ﬁscal theory of the price level has emphasized the potential links between
ﬁscal policy and the price level (see, among others, Cochrane [2001], Sims
[1994] and [1999], and Woodford [2001]).2
The main conclusions of the analysis can be summarized as follows: 1)
The estimated eﬀects of ﬁscal policy on GDP tend to be small: positive
government spending multipliers larger than 1 tend to be the exception; the
tax multipliers are usually negative but even smaller in absoulte value; 2) The
eﬀects of ﬁscal policy on GDP and its components have become substantially
weaker over time: in the post-1980 period signiﬁcantly negative multipliers of
government spending are the norm; the negative eﬀects of taxation have also
become weaker; 3) To understand the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy on prices, the
price elasticity of the government budget items is crucial, an issue that has not
been widely appreciated. Once Once plausible values of the price elasticity
of government spending are imposed, the negative eﬀects of government
spending on prices that have been frequently estimated become positive,
although usually small and not always signiﬁcant; 4) Government spending
shocks have signiﬁcant eﬀects on the nominal and real short interest rate,
but of varying signs: in the post-1980 period, after 4 quarters the eﬀect is
positive in three countries, negative in two; 5) In the post-1980 period, net
tax shocks have positive short run eﬀects on the nominal interest rate, and
typically negative or zero eﬀects on prices; 6) The US is an outlier in many
dimensions; responses to ﬁs c a ls h o c k se s t i m a t e do nU Sd a t aa r eo f t e nn o t
representative of the average OECD country included in this sample.3
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy reviews alternative
approaches that have been used to identify ﬁscal shocks in VARs and the
methodology I use. Section 3 describes the data and how the elasticities of
government spending and taxes to economic activity are constructed. Sec-
tion 4 brieﬂy discusses a few diagnostic checks on the estimated VARs. The
2The evidence presented in this paper, however, has nothing to say on the ﬁscal theory
of the price level. By its nature, the theory places no testable restriction on the observed
relation between ﬁscal variables and the price level.
3It is well understood, but still worth repeating, that the results presented here have
n o t h i n gt os a ya b o u tt h ee ﬀects of systematic ﬁscal policy as a stabilizing tool, an issue a
VAR by its nature is ill equipped to address. See Jones [2002] for an interesting analysis
of this issue.
2estimated eﬀects of government spending on GDP and the short interest rate
are presented in Section 5. Section 6 discusses the eﬀects of government
spending shocks on GDP components. Section 7 discusses the rationale for
and consequences of including interest rates in the VAR. Section 8 presents
the price responses to government spending shocks. Section 9 displays the
results of a tax shock on GDP, interest rate and prices. Section 10c o n -
cludes. An appendix provides further details on the construction of the tax
elasticities.
2T h e ﬁscal shocks
2.1 Approaches to identiﬁcation
A small but growing literature has recently applied VAR methods to the
analysis of ﬁscal policy In this section, I brieﬂy review the four diﬀerent
approaches to identiﬁcation of ﬁscal policy shocks that have been used.4
(i) In a ﬁrst group, represented by Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher
[2001], Christiano, Eichenbaumand Eidelberg [1999] , and Ramey and Shapiro
[1998], ﬁscal policy shocks are identiﬁed by way of the “narrative approach”
of Romer and Romer [1989]. All these papers trace the eﬀects of a dummy
variable capturing the “Ramey and Shapiro” ﬁscal episodes: the Korean war
military buildup, the Vietnam war buildup, and the Reagan ﬁscal expansion.
The advantages and disadvantages of this approach are well known. If
these episodes are truly exogenous and unanticipated, and one is only inter-
ested in estimating their eﬀects, there is no need to impose other potentially
controversial identifying assumptions: all is needed is a reduced form regres-
sion. But the approach might run into two types of problems. First, these
episodes might not be entirely unanticipated. Second, other substantial ﬁscal
shocks, of diﬀerent type or sign, might have occurred around the same time,
thus polluting the identiﬁcation of the ﬁscal shocks.5
(ii) A second approach, represented by Mountford and Uhlig [2002], con-
sists in identifying ﬁscal shocks by sign restrictions on the impulse responses,
following a methodology originally applied by Uhlig [1997] and Faust [1998]
4This brief review is based on the papers known to me at the time of writing. I apologize
for involuntary omissions of relevant contributions.
5For instance, Ramey and Shapiro date the start of the Korean war shock in 1950:3,
based on the large observed increase in military spending; but net tax revenues also in-
creased by more than three standard deviations in 1950:2 and 1950:3; and in four quarters
between 1948:2 and 1950:3, government spending increased by between two and three
standard deviations. It is not obvious how to disentangle the eﬀects of the Korean dummy
variable from the delayed eﬀects of these preceding ﬁscal shocks.
3to monetary policy analysis. For instance, “revenue” shocks are identiﬁed by
imposing that tax revenue response increases while the government spending
response does not, and that all responses such that both tax revenues and
GDP increase identify a business cycle shock.
An important advantage of this approach is that it is well suited to handle
anticipated ﬁscal shocks: the estimated eﬀect on, say, private consumption
at time 0 could be the response to a revenue shock that occurs later. On the
other hand, by identifying revenue shocks via the condition that tax revenues
and output do not covary positively in response to the shock, the approach
rules out by assumption a whole set of “non-keynesian” output responses to
ﬁscal shocks.6 A second cost of this approach is also related to its beneﬁts:
while it can better handle anticipated ﬁscal policy, it cannot pin down when
the ﬁscal shock occurs.
(iii) A third approach, represented by Fatas and Mihov [2001]a n dF a v e r o
[2002], essentially relies on Choleski ordering to identify ﬁscal shocks. In the
former, government spending is ordered ﬁrst: in the latter, ﬁscal shocks are
ordered last, by analogy to monetary shocks in some recent monetary policy
VAR contributions. A discussion of this approach will be implicit in the
discussion of the next one.
(iv) The fourth approach, developed by Blanchard and Perotti [2002], is
akin to a structural VAR.7 Identiﬁcation is achieved by exploiting decision
lags in ﬁscal policy, and institutional information about the elasticity of ﬁscal
variables to economic activity. In this paper, I extend this approach to take
into account interest rates and inﬂation.8
Consider the benchmark speciﬁcation, a 5-variable VAR that includes the
following variables: the log of real government spending on goods and services
per capita gt (government spending for short), the log of real net primary
taxes per capita (deﬁned as government revenues less government transfers,
both net of property income) tt, the log of real output per capita yt,t h el o g
of the price level pt, and the 3-month nominal interest rate it.9 Denoting
6For some empirical evidence on non-Keynesian eﬀects of ﬁscal policy, see Alesina et
al. [2002], Giavazzi, Jappelli and Pagano [2000], and Perotti [1999]. Other shocks in teh
Mountford and Uhlig [2002] approach, like spending shocks, are identiﬁed with a minimal
set of restrictions, involving only the behavior of government spending and taxation.
7An early application of this approach is Blanchard and Watson [1986].
8At the same time as this paper was being written, Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba [2002]
also extended the Blanchard and Perotti [2002] methodology to include inﬂation and in-
terest rate responses to the analysis of US ﬁscal policy. Instead of bringing in external
information on the elasticities of ﬁscal variables to economic activity, Marcellino [2002]
estimates these elasticities by speciﬁying a larger model with overidentifying restrictions.
9This two-way breakdown of the government budget is obviously only one of many
possible. Most models would predict that government spending on goods and services has
4the vector of endogenous variables by Xt and the vector of reduced form
residuals by Ut, the reduced form VAR can be written as:
Xt = A(L)Xt−1 + Ut, (1)
where Xt ≡ [gt tt yt pt it]0 and Ut ≡ [u
g
t ut
t u
y
t u
p
t ui
t]0.
The reduced form residuals of the gt and tt equations, u
g
t and ut
t, can be
thought of as the sum of the automatic and discretionary shocks to govern-
ment spending and net taxes, respectively. Taxes and, to a lesser degree,
government spending react automatically to shocks in the other endogenous
variables, for instance because of the automatic increase in tax revenues when
output increases, holding constant tax rates. Taxes and government spending
can also be changed in a discretionary way by the policymaker, for instance
by changing the tax rates themselves. Formally, one can write the reduced
form government spending and net tax residuals as
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where e
g
t and et
t are the “structural” shocks to government spending and
taxes, part of the vector of mutually uncorrelated “structural” shocks Ft ≡
[e
g
t et
t ex
t e
p
t ei
t]0. The key to identiﬁcation is the observation that it
typically takes longer than three months to decide a discretionary change in
ﬁscal policy; as a consequence, in quarterly data the coeﬃcients α0
jksi n( 2 )
reﬂect only the automatic response of ﬁscal variables to economic activity,
and e
g
t and et
t can be interpreted as the discretionary components of the ﬁscal
policy reduced form residuals.
Identifying e
g
t and et
t would still not be feasible if one had to estimate the
α0
jks, because e
g
t and et
t are correlated with the reduced form residuals on the
rhs of (2). However, we do have independent information on the α0
jks, whose
construction is discussed in detail in the next section. With these values of
the α0
jks, one can construct linear combinations of the two structural shocks,
or the cyclically adjusted ﬁscal shocks:
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diﬀerent eﬀects than transfers. Summing algebraically taxes and transfers makes sense
if one believes that in the short- and medium run ﬁscal policy operates mostly via a
demand channel. In future work, I am planning to study diﬀerent disaggregations of the
government budgets — in particular, government consumption vs government investment,
and taxes vs transfers.
5There is still little guidance, theoretical or empirical, on how to sort out the
two structural shocks et
t and e
g
t from the cyclically adjusted ﬁscal shocks.
Therefore, I compute impulse responses under the two alternative orthog-
onalizations: as it turns out, in all cases the correlation between the two
cyclically adjusted ﬁscal shocks is low enough that the ordering of the struc-
t u r a ls h o c k si si m m a t e r i a lt ot h er e s u l t s . 10
Because both e
g
t and et
t are orthogonal to the other structural shocks of
the economy; they can be used as instruments in the remaining equations.11
Once the structural shocks are identiﬁed, the impulse responses are con-
structed using the average elasticities over the relevant sample periods.
2.2 What are the ﬁscal shocks?
How to interpret the ﬁscal policy shocks et
t and e
g
t? Government spending is
typically budgeted in advance for the whole ﬁscal year, hence one could ar-
gue that the ﬁscal shocks identiﬁed by the methodology above are not really
unanticipated. However, the yearly budget is often mostly a political doc-
ument, whose ﬁgures typically bear little relation to the actual expenditure
eventually disbursed, and which is discounted by the private sector as such.
In addition, even if the total expenditure for the year were ﬁxed and reliable,
actual cash disbursements can vary unpredictably on a quarterly basis for a
variety of reasons.12
More importantly, there are shocks to budgeted expenditure all through
the year, due to mid-year legislation and executive decisions. Under this
interpretation, however, while as we have seen decision lags in ﬁscal policy-
making help identify the shocks, implementation lags contribute to making
them predictable.
Thus, the validity of the identiﬁcation procedure outlined here is a matter
of degree. It depends on how long and predictable the decision lags are
relative to the implementation lags, and on how important the yearly budget
is relative to quarterly policymaking.
10Although I consider only the two Choleski orderings of the two cyclically adjusted
ﬁscal variables, one should recognize that, lacking a theory, really any rotation of the two
shocks could be defended.
11The ordering of the remaining variables is immaterial if one is only interested in
estimating the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy shocks, as it is the case in this paper. Assuming
for instance that output is ordered ﬁrst among the other variables, one can estimate the
“output” equation u
y
t = γytut
t +γygu
g
t +e
y
t, using et
t and e
g
t as instruments for ut
t and u
g
t,
and similarly for the other equations.
12Strictly speaking, the ﬁscal policy shock of the last quarter of the ﬁscal year would be
perfectly predictable under these hypotheses.
63S p e c i ﬁcation, samples and data
3.1 Speciﬁcation and samples
Ie s t i m a t et h eV A Rs p e c i ﬁc a t i o nd e s c r i b e di ns e c t i o n2 . 1on quarterly data
from ﬁve countries: Australia, Canada, West Germany, United Kingdom, and
Unites States.13 The benchmark VAR includes the logs of real GDP, real
government spending and real net taxes, all in per capita terms, and deﬂated
using the GDP deﬂator; the log of the GDP deﬂator; and the nominal 3
months interest rate (the federal funds rate for the US). All variables (except
the interest rates) have been seasonally adjusted by the original sources. All
equations include four lags of each endogenous variable, a constant, and no
time trends. The precise samples of the benchmark VARs are: USA: 1961:1
- 2000:4; West Germany: 1961:1 - 1989:4; United Kingdom: 1964:1 - 2001:2;
Canada: 1962:1 - 2001:4; Australia: 1964:1 - 2000:4.
3.2 The data
One reason why ﬁscal policy VARs have been less popular than their mone-
tary policy counterparts is that ﬁscal policy data at high enough frequency
are more diﬃcult to collect; in most countries they simply do not exist.14
All the ﬁscal data used in this paper originate from only one source per
country, ensuring internal consistency;15 i na l lc a s e s ,t h eﬁscal data are part
13In Blanchard and Perotti [2002], we estimated quarter dependent 3-variable VARs,
on the basis that there is some quarter dependence in tax collections. However, we also
found that quarter dependence makes little diﬀerence for the US. The description of the
institutional features of the tax systems in Appendix 1 makes clear that only for corporate
income taxes in the United Kingdom is quarter dependence likely to be substantial. More-
over, in the 5-variable VARs that I estimate in this paper, allowing for quarter dependence
would quickly exhaust the available degrees of freedom.
14Of the other OECD countries, France, Japan and New Zealand seem to have quarterly
general government budget ﬁgures for long enough periods. However, it appears that parts
of the budget data of these countries might be interpolated from annual ﬁgures. I am
currently investigating the nature of the data for these countries.
Other countries have some quarterly or even monthly data on some parts of the budget,
or covering only the central government accounts. Some commerical vendors and interna-
tional organizations also have quarterly or semi-annual ﬁgures on the general government
budget of several countries, but, with the exceptions of the countries included in this
paper, these are to varying extents interpolated from annual ﬁgures.
15The sources for both the ﬁscal and the national income accounts data are: the NIPA
accounts from the Bureau of Economic Analysis for the US; the DIW National Account ﬁles
for Germany; the United Kingdom National Accounts and the Financial Statistics ﬁles,
from the Oﬃce of National Statistics, for the United Kingdom; the CANSIM database
of Statistics Canada for Canada; and the Australian Bureau of Statistics database for
7of the integrated system of national accounts, thus ensuring consistency with
other national income account data. In general, all the government budget
and national income account data follow the guidelines of the 1993 System
of National Accounts. The two ﬁscal variables used in the VARs, net taxes
and government spending, have been constructed from disaggregated data as
follows:
Net taxes = Revenues - Transfers
Revenues = Tax revenues + Non-tax revenues
Tax revenues = Direct taxes on individuals + Direct taxes on corporation
+ Social security taxes + Production taxes
Non-tax revenues = Current transfers received by the general government
+ Net capital transfers received by the general government
Transfers: = Social security transfers to households + Other transfers to
households + Subsidies to ﬁr m s+T r a n s f e r sa b r o a d
Government spending on goods and services = Government consumption
+ Government gross capital formation
Government gross capital formation = Gross ﬁxed capital formation by
the government + Net acquisition of non produced non ﬁnancial assets +
Change in inventories
Some sub-items have been reclassiﬁed relative to the 1993 SNA deﬁnition
in order to make each item more homogeneous in terms of its output and
price elasticity. Thus, in the 1993 SNA the item “Direct taxes on individuals”
includes mostly income taxes, but also property taxes, taxes on land, and
poll taxes, all of which are not elastic to output contemporaneously, and
licenses and fees paid by households, which are closer to indirect taxes.16 The
item “Production taxes” includes mostly indirect taxes like VAT, but also
payroll taxes, which are more akin to social security taxes, and land taxes,
which also are inelastic to GDP contemporaneously. Whenever possible, I
have reclassiﬁed all revenue items that are inelastic to GDP into “Current
transfers received by the government” or “Net capital transfers received by
the government”;17 I have also reclassiﬁed payroll taxes into “Social security
Australia.
16Licenses and fees paid by businesses are included in production taxes.
17In the 1993 SNA, “Current transfers received by the government” include items such
as fees and penalties and transfers from international cooperation; “Net capital transfers
received by the government” include mainly taxes on ownership and betterment of land,
death and gift duties, and capital transfers to private and public enterprises to cover
operating deﬁcits. Thus, both components of non-tax revenues are inelastic to output
within the quarter. Note that in some countries, like Germany and Australia, net capital
transfers are not reported on a quarterly basis.
8taxes”, and licenses and fees paid by households into “Production taxes”.
The item “Social security tranfers” includes unfunded pension liabilities
contributions by the government; as these items also appear as social security
contributions, they wash out when constructing net taxes.
The item “Government consumption” (or “Current spending on goods
and services”) is net of market sales by the government and of capital con-
sumption allowances, an item which is usually imprecisely measured. The
item “Government gross capital formation” includes the change in invento-
ries, but often quarterly data on acquisition of non produced non-ﬁnancial
assets (a very minor item) are missing.
The items “Property income received” and “Property income paid” by
the government — mostly interest, but also rents and dividends from state
owned enterprises — are excluded, for two reasons: there coverage tends to
be spotty in quarterly data, and there are economic reasons to focus on the
primary budget.
Under the guidelines of the new 1993 National Income Account Systems,
all budget items should be recorded on an accrual basis. If this were in-
deed the case, there would be no issue of collection lags: all taxes would
be recorded at the time the corresponding liability arises. In reality, even
in the new system taxes are at most recorded on a “modiﬁed cash” basis,
which consists in adjusting for the lag between the time taxes are withheld
by the employer or paid by the taxpayer and the time they are recorded by
the agency in charge of collecting them.
The series cover the whole budget of the general government (central
government + state and local governments + social security funds), not just a
few items. This is important because most theories postulate that the eﬀects
of a budget item also depend on the concomitant and expected movements in
the others. Covering the whole general government is also important because
from the point of view of the private sector an increase in income taxes by
the local government is likely to have similar eﬀects, to a ﬁrst approximation,
as the same increase by the central government.
Among the other data, the short interest rate is often the binding con-
straint on the length of the sample. I use an interest rate as close as possible
to a Central Bank instrument, provided an unbroken series is available from
the early 1960s.18
18All interest rates are expressed on an annual basis. In the benchmark speciﬁcations,
I use the Federal Funds Rate in the USA; the interest rate on three month bills for the
United Kingdom (variable 11260CZ, International Financial Statistics of the International
Monetary Fund); the three month interbank rate in West Germany (series IRS in the
OECD Quarterly National Accounts database); the treasury bill rate in Canada (series
15660CZ, International Financial Statistics of the International Monetary Fund); and the
93.3 Constructing the output and price elasticities
The coeﬃcients αjk’s in equation (2) are weighted averages of the elasticity
of each component of net taxes and government spending.19
Consider ﬁrst the output elasticity of net taxes. The output elasticity
of each component of tax revenues is constructed from a decomposition of
actual revenues into a tax rate and a tax base. Start with direct taxes on
individuals, typically the largest component of tax revenues. This can be
written as:20
Ht = S(WtPt)Wt(Et)Et(Yt) (4)
where Ht is total real direct taxes on individuals, S is the tax rate, Wt is the
real wage, Pt is the GDP deﬂator, Et is employment, and Yt is output. Thus,
WtEt is the tax base (ignoring non-labor income). Letting lower-case letters
denote logs, and totally diﬀerentiating, one obtains:
dht =
∂s
∂wt
dwt +
∂wt
∂et
det +
∂et
∂yt
dyt +
∂s
∂pt
dpt (5a)
=
·µ
∂s
∂wt
+1
¶
∂wt
∂et
+1
¸
∂et
∂yt
dyt +
∂s
∂pt
dpt (5b)
Thus, the term multiplying dyt in (5b) is the equivalent of αty in equation
(2a) for this particular tax revenue, and the term ∂s/∂pt is the equivalent of
αtp.
For most member countries, the OECD computes the elasticity of tax
revenues per person to average real earnings, the term ∂s/∂wt +1in (5b),
using information on the tax code of each country and the distribution of
t a xp a y e r si ne a c hb r a c k e t ,a ti n t e r v a l so faf e wy e a r s . 21 Following Blanchard
and Perotii [2002] I then estimate the contemporaneous elasticity of the real
wage to employment, ∂wt/∂et, as the coeﬃcient on lag 0 from a regression
of the log change in real wage on lead 1 and lags 0 to 4 of log employment
changes; and I estimate the elasticity of employment to output, ∂et/ ∂yt, in
a similar way.22 A similar methodology can be used to estimate the elasticity
of social security taxes to output.
interest rate on three month Treasury notes in Australia (series VNEQ.UN_RTN until
decmber 1997 and FIRMMTNIY3 since January 1998, from the Reserve Bank of Australia
database).
19For West Germany, I do not have a quarterly breakdown of income taxes into individual
and corporation income taxes. I use yearly ﬁgures to construct the relevant weights.
20This formalizes the approach followed by the OECD to construct annual elasticities:
see e.g. Giorno et al. [1995].
21Data on ∂s/∂wt +1are obtained from Giorno et al. [1995] until 1992, and from van
den Noord [2002] after 1992.
22The estimated contemporaneous quarterly employment elasticity of wages is typically
10To estimate the output elasticity of the corporate income tax, I ﬁrst
regress the log diﬀerence of the tax base (the operating proﬁts of ﬁnancial and
non ﬁnancial corporations) on lags -1 to 4 of the log diﬀerence of output; the
estimated coeﬃcient on lag 0 provides the elasticity of the tax base to output.
Because corporate income taxes are usually proportional, the elasticity of
corporate income tax revenues to the tax base is assumed to be 1. Finally,
the elasticity of production taxes to output is assumed to be 1.
This is not the end of the story, however, because in several countries some
taxes are collected with substantial lags with respect to the transaction that
generates the tax liability. For instance, corporation taxes in the UK are due
several quarters after the end of the corporation’s ﬁscal year; in Australia
and West Germany quarterly installments of the corporation income tax
are based on the previous year’s assessed tax liability; the same is true for
income from self-employment in Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, and
West Germany. In these cases, the contemporaneous quarterly elasticity of
the tax revenue to its tax base is eﬀectively 0, even though the statutory
and the yearly elasticities are positive (see Appendix 1 for details). When
t a x e so ns e l fe m p l o y m e n ti n c o m eh a v ea ne ﬀective elasticity of zero, I adjust
the elasticity of income taxes on individuals by multiplying the value in
brackets in (5b) by the ratio of self-employment to total employment, or
of self-employment income to total wages and salaries. If possible, I also
estimate ∂w/∂e and ∂e/∂y by using data on dependent employment only
instead of total employment. As discussed in section ??, the quarterly output
elasticity of all components of non-tax revenues is likely to be about 0.
Information on the output elasticity of transfers is more limited, but an
educated guess suggests it is small. Items like old age, disability and inva-
lidity pensions — the bulk of transfers to households — do not have built-in
mechanisms that make them respond automatically to changes in employ-
ment or output contemporaneously. Unemployment beneﬁts obviously do,
but they typically account for a small part of government spending: in 1994-
95, the largest spender on unemployment compensation was Australia, with
1.64 percent of GDP; if all active and passive measures are included, the
largest spender was West Germany, with 3.03 percent of GDP.23 In all cases
the sum of spending on passive and active measures was less than 10p e r -
cent of total government expenditure. Hence, I assume an output elasticity
of transfer of -.2. This is rather generous, and allows for spillover eﬀects in
negative in Australia and very small, with a t-statistic below .5, in the United Kingdom.
The same is true for the output elasticity of employment in Australia. When the estimate
of ∂w/∂e or of ∂e/∂y is negative or its t-statistic is below 1, as a rule I set them to 0 in
constructing the elasticities.
23See OECD [1996]. Data for West Germany are unvailable.
11other programs: for instance, some anti-poverty programs like AFDC in the
US might display some within-quarter elasticity to output. As we will see,
however, reasonable alternative values of the output elasticity of transfers
make essentially no diﬀerence to the results.
Now consider the price elasticity of net taxes, αtp. For individual income
taxes and social security taxes, the elasticity of real revenues to the price
level, holding constant employment, output and the real wage, is equal to
∂st/∂wt, which can be obtained by subtracting 1 from the OECD estimate
of the elasticity of tax revenues per person to average real earnings. It is well
known that inﬂation has many and complex eﬀects on corporate income tax
revenues, in both directions. Any attempt to quantify these eﬀects in all of
the countries studied in this work would deliver extremely unreliable results.
Hence I assume a 0 price elasticity of real corporate income taxes.24 Ia l s o
assume a 0 price elasticity for production taxes and non-tax revenues.
Many transfer programs are indexed to the CPI; however, indexation
typically occurs with a substantial lag. A review of indexation clauses in
OECD countries in the postwar period did not uncover any government
spending program that has been or is indexed to inﬂation contemporaneously
at quarterly frequency. Hence, I set the quarterly price elasticity of real
government transfers to -1.
Turn now to the output and price elasticities of government spending
on goods and services, the coeﬃcients αgy and αgp in equation (2b). It is
hard to think of any quantitatively relevant mechanism by which govern-
ment consumption or investment should respond automatically to output
contemporaneously: consequently, I set αgy =0 .25 The elasticity of real gov-
ernment spending to the price level is more complicated. Consider ﬁrst the
wage component of current spending on goods and services (typically, slightly
less than half the total spending). While government wages were indexed to
the CPI during part of the sample in some countries, in all cases indexation
occurred with a considerable lag, well above one quarter. Hence, real govern-
ment spending on wages is likely to have an elasticity to the GDP deﬂator
of -1.
Some of the non-wage component of government spending on goods and
services might be ﬁxed in nominal terms within the quarter, implying a price
elasticity of real spending equal to -1. Other parts, like spending on drugs in
24In a detailed study on the eﬀects of inﬂation on government revenues and expenditure
in Sweden, Persson, Persson and Svensson [1998] conclude that it is impossible to quantify
credibly the eﬀects of inﬂation on corporate income taxes. They also assume a zero
inﬂation elasticity of corporate income taxes.
25A typically cited counterexample is disaster relief; however, this spending item is
minimal, particularly in the countries included in this study.
12nationalized health services, might be eﬀectively indexed to the price level
within the quarter, implying an elasticity of 0. Overall, a price elasticity of
real government spending well below 0 seems justiﬁed. In my benchmark
speciﬁcations, I will assume αgp = -.5.
Because I only include the primary budget of the general government, I set
the interest rate semi-elasticity of both net taxes and government spending to
0: αgi = αti =0 . This is probably a safe assumption for government spending;
it is slightly more uncertain for net taxes26. Note that, when studying the
eﬀects of government spending, the tax elasticity plays no role.
Having constructed the output and price elasticity of each component of
net taxes, the elasticity of net taxes is constructed as weighted averages of
the elasticities of each components. Table 1 shows the net tax elasticities to
output and to the GDP deﬂator in each country over the whole sample and
the main subsamples.27 The output elasticity is very low in Australia, mainly
for two reasons: the quarterly output elasticity of direct taxes on individuals
is zero, because both the estimated output elasticity of real wages to employ-
ment and of employment to output are zero; and corporate income taxes have
zero contemporaneous elasticity to their tax base, because quarterly install-
ments are paid on the previous year’s assessed tax liability. The elasticity is
slightly larger in the UK, which has a similar tax system to Australia but a
small positive output elasticity of employment; it is still larger in West Ger-
many, with a still higher output elasticity of employment.28 It is highest in
Canada and USA, the only two countries where corporate income taxes have
a positive contemporaneous elasticity to corporate proﬁts (see Appendix 1).
It is well known that in quarterly data corporate proﬁts are highly elastic to
output (in both Canada and the US, the estimated contemporaneous output
elasticity of proﬁts is above 4): this accounts for the large contribution of
corporate income taxes to the aggregate elasticity of net taxes in countries
with a non-zero contemporaneous elasticity of corporate income tax revenues
26One could argue that the individual income tax base includes interest income, which
would imply a positive interest rate semi-elasticity of individual income taxes. Yet it also
includes dividend income, which might covary negatively with the interest rate. Like for
the eﬀects of prices, the eﬀects of interest rates on corporate income tax revenues are
extremely complex. Canzoneri et al. [2002] conduct a careful exercise to quantify the
interest semi-elasticity of net taxes.
27Note that in general this elasticity varies over time, because so do the real wage
elasticity of tax revenues per person computed by the OECD, the estimated elasticities
of real wages to employment and of employment to output, and the estimated output
elasticities of corporate proﬁts.
28Note that in all these three countries, the estimated employment elasticity of real
wages is either negative (Australia, West Germany) or positive but with a t-statistics
below 1 (UK), hence it has been set to 0 according to the rule described above.
13to corporate proﬁts.
4A ﬁrst look at the estimates
4.1 Do the ﬁscal shocks make sense?
Are the estimated ﬁscal shocks reasonable? This is a rather loose question,
but a legitimate one (see Rudebusch [1998]). Since the key facts of US ﬁs-
cal policy are much better known, I will limit the analysis to the US case.
Figure 1 displays the estimated government spending and net tax shocks, e
g
t
and et
t, from the benchmark 5 variable VAR on the whole sample, multiplied
by the average share of government spending and net taxes in GDP, respec-
tively, to express them as shares of GDP. The shaded areas correspond to the
three years following and including the onset of the two Ramey and Shapiro
episodes in this sample, the Vietnam war buildup that started in 1965:1 and
the Carter- Reagan buildup that started in 1980:1.
The estimated shocks capture well the ﬁrst buildup, much less so the sec-
ond one. There are several reasons for this: total government spending on
goods and services rose at a much faster rate in 1966 and 1967 (10 percent
and 7 percent, respectively) than in 1980 , 1981 and 1982 (2, -.1,a n d1 per-
cent, respectively). It is not often appreciated that, while defense spending
rose at an average rate of about 6% between 1980 and 1981, non defense
current spending on goods and services did not move in real terms, and non-
defense capital spending fell at an average rate of about 4 percent. Note that
the estimated ﬁscal shock captures much better the increase in government
spending on goods and services between 1984 and 1987, when the latter rose
at an average rate above 4 percent, with non-defense current and capital
government spending rising at average rates of 3 and 6 percent, respectively.
The structural net tax shock captures well the 1968 tax surcharge and
the (much larger) 1975. It is mostly positive between 1980 and 1982; this
however is easily explained in view of the large fall in GDP per capita in
1980 (-1.3 percent) and especially in 1982 (-3 percent).
4.2 Subsample stability
Table 2 displays the results from a standard Chow test on each reduced form
regression, with a break point in 1980:1 (1975:1 in West Germany). There
is substantial evidence of instability: in each country except West Germany
at least two of the ﬁve Chow tests have a p-value smaller than .05. We will
see that the impulse responses to ﬁscal shocks have very diﬀerent properties
14in the two subsamples. 29
5T h e e ﬀects of government spending on out-
put
5.1 Eﬀects on aggregate GDP
Table 3 and Figure 2 display the eﬀects of a shock to e
g
t equal to 1 percentage
point of GDP30, from a VAR in 5 variables with g and t ordered ﬁrst and
second, respectively; the benchmark case displayed in this table also assumes
an elasticity of real government spending to prices equal to -.5. To allow a
comparison of the results across the 5 countries in a compact way, the table
displays the responses of GDP on impact and after 4, 12 and 20 quarters,
and the maximum and minimum GDP response up to 20 quarters, with the
quarter at which it occurs (the maximum GDP response will also be called
the “government spending multiplier” in what follows). The two lines on
each side of the impulse response give one standard error bands, computed
by Monte Carlo simulations based on 500 replications, as in e.g. Stock and
Watson [2001].
Over the whole sample, the impact response is positive and signiﬁcant
in all countries. For the US, this is consistent with the positive response
estimated by Blanchard and Perotti [2002], Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher
[1999], Fatas and Mihov [2001], Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba [2002], and
Mountford and Uhlig [2002]. The size of the impact response is similar in all
countries, between .3 and .4 percentage points (pps) of GDP except in West
29Even if the break were in a part of the structural VAR diﬀerent from the ﬁscal policy
equations, it would appear in the whole reduced form and hence it would confound the
identiﬁcation of the ﬁscal shocks and the impulse responses to ﬁscal shocks.
The Chow test assumes that we know the time of the possible structural break, which
we do not. There is mounting evidence in some recent literature of a breakdown in several
macroeconomic relations around 1980 (see e.g. Stock and Watson [2002]). A downside
of this procedure is that the break date chosen here is not strictly speaking exogenous,
implying that the critical values of the conventional Chow test used here are too small.
A common alternative would have been to use a test, like the Andrews [1993] sup-Wald
test, that does not assume such knowledge. But because of the very large number of
parameters in the reduced form, the small sample properties of the latter test might be
problematic.
30The impulse response of government spending and taxes are multiplied by their re-
spective average shares in GDP to obtain impulse responses in terms of shares of GDP.
The actual response of government spending on impact is usually slightly diﬀerent from
1, because of the feedback from ouput and price changes to gt (recall that the shock is on
e
g
t).
15Germany, where it is 1.30 pps of GDP. In fact, over the ﬁrst 3 years, in all
countries the largest eﬀect on GDP occurs on impact; in the US, after about
4 years GDP has the absolute peak at about 1 pp of GDP. Thus, in no case
is the maximum GDP response much larger than 1, and in three countries
it is less than .5.31
These results, however, hide a substantial diﬀerence between the ﬁrst
and second halves of the sample. When the model is estimated over the
two subsamples separately32, the pattern that emerges is rather clear: in
all countries except Australia, the eﬀects of government spending shocks on
GDP in the post-1980 period are substantially smaller than in the pre-1980
period. In fact, in the post-1980 sample the response of GDP in the ﬁrst four
countries is never signiﬁcantly positive (except for West Germany on impact),
and it becomes signiﬁcantly negative within the ﬁrst 3 years. The minimum
response in all these countries is always smaller than -1,a n ds i g n i ﬁcant.
One may wonder whether these results are due to a fundamental diﬀerence
in the government spending process over the two subsamples, in particular if
the government spending response to its own shock is less persistent in the
post-1980 period. Table 4 shows clearly that this is not the case. The cumu-
lative response of government spending (as a share of GDP) to a government
spending shock at quarters 4, 12 and 20 (columns 1 to 3) is remarkably sim-
ilar across countries: for instance, at quarter 4 in the whole sample it ranges
from 2.89 pp of GDP in Australia to 3.55 in the US. It is also similar across
subperiods, with the exceptions of West Germany and the UK after 3 or
more years.
The cumulative multipliers 33 (columns 4 to 6 of Table 4) provide an even
clearer picture: except for Australia, they are uniformly much higher in the
pre-1980 period than in the post-1980 period. In the latter, the cumula-
tive output multiplier is 0 after 4 quarters, and substantially negative after
12 quarters (except in the US where it is essentially 0). As before, these
inequalities are reversed in Australia.
Note that the largest multiplier at 4 quarters is observed in West Ger-
31The shape of the impulse response is qualitatively similar in all countries (see Figure
2): after the initial rise, GDP starts declining, and after about 4 quarters it rises again;
only in Germany and the US, however, is this second increase economically and statistically
signiﬁcant.
32When estimating the model over diﬀerent subsamples, each time I recompute the
average elasticities over the relevant subsample. In doing so, if data are available I also
reestimate the output elasticity of employment and the employment elasticity of wages
over the relevant subsamples.
33The cumulative multiplier at quarter x is deﬁned as the ratio of the cumulative re-
sponse of GDP at quarter x to the cumulative response of government spending at the
same quarter.
16many, at 12 quarters in the US, and at 20 quarters in the US and Canada.
Hence, while the results are mildly supportive of the notion that the most
closed economy of the group tends to have larger multipliers, the ranking is
not as clear cut as a standard leakage argument would suggest.
It is interesting to compare the estimated cumulative multipliers from this
exercise with the cumulative multipliers typically provided by large scale
econometric models. This is done in Table 5.34 The large scale macro-
econometric models tend to predict larger cumulative multipliers than those
estimated here, in particular those estimated on the post-1980 sample.
5.2 The role of monetary policy
One could argue that diﬀerences in the government spending multipliers,
both over time and across countries, might be caused by diﬀerences in the
behavior of the monetary authorities.
Table 6 displays the eﬀects of a unit shock to governments spending on
the nominal (ﬁrst 4 columns) and real (columns 5 to 8) short interest rates,
as well as on the cumulative deﬁcit (last 4 columns).35 Consider the nominal
interest rate ﬁrst. In the US, it falls on impact in all three samples; even
after 4 quarters, it declines by -.5 pps in the pre-1980 sample and by 1.4 pps
in the post-1980 sample.
This response is puzzling, and indeed it has puzzled other researchers that
have also found it in US data, like Mountford and Uhlig [2002] and Edelberg,
Eichenbaum and Fisher [1999];36 yet, once again, it is not necessarily typical.
Outside the US, in the whole sample the nominal interest rate increases in all
countries, except in West Germany after 12 quarters. In the post-1980 period,
the nominal interest rate falls also in the UK; in West Germany, Canada
and Australia it increases, although in the former it is rather imprecisely
estimated.
The real short term interest rate follows a similar pattern.37 Over the
34The multipliers of the macro econometric models are from Sims [1988], who in turn
summarizes the results of the Brookings comparison project (see Bryant et al. [1988]).
It should be noted that some models have changed since then, in particular more models
have incorporated forward - looking behavior.
Also, it is well known that it is very diﬃcult to compare the output of simulations
across models, because it is very diﬃcult to hold ”everything else” constant. The use of
cumulative multipliers is intended to minimize this problem.
35Strictly speaking, this exercise is fully meaningful only under ﬂexible exchange rates.
36Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba [2002] ﬁnd a prolonged, though small, increase in the
federal funds rate after a spending shock.
37The real interest rate is deﬁned here as it− (Ept+4− pt). If the alternative deﬁnition
it−4(Ept+1−pt) had been used, in some cases the real interest rate would have displayed
17whole sample, after 4 quarters it falls in the US and, very marginally, in
Australia; it increases in the other countries. In all cases, the response is
rather precisely estimated. In the post-1980 period, it falls the US and in
the UK, and it increases in the other three countries.
Can the diﬀerence in the output response between the pre- and post-1980
samples be explained by a stronger interest rate response in the latter? No.38
Only in Canada does the real interest rate at 4 quarters increase more in
the post-1980 sample than in the pre-1980 sample; in all other countries, it
increases less, or falls more.
Can the diﬀerence in the output response across countries be explained
by a diﬀerent behavior of the real interest rate? The answer is unclear. In
the post-1980 sample, the real interest rate falls after 4 quarters in the UK,
but the cumulative multiplier at the same horizon is also negative. If one
excludes the UK, the two countries with the largest real interest rate response
at 4 quarters in the post-1980 sample, West Germany and Canada, also have
the lowest cumulative multiplier.
What about the reverse direction of causality, i.e. can the behavior of
the real interest rate be explained by the cumulative deﬁcit? Not really.
The last 4 columns of Table 6 display the cumulative deﬁcit response to the
government spending shock. Consider the post-1980 sample for brevity. The
country with the largest increase in the cumulative deﬁcit after 4 quarters,
the UK, also has the second largest fall in the real interest rate; conversely,
the country with the second smallest increase in the deﬁcit, West Germany,
also has the second largest increase in the real interest rate at the same
horizon.
5.3 Other robustness checks
All the impulse responses presented so far were recomputed under the as-
sumption that government spending is ordered second, after net taxes. The
diﬀerences were minimal: typically the point estimates of the impulse re-
sponses at all horizons change by only a few undredthos of a percentage
point.
a very large fall in the ﬁrst few quarters (in the order of 3 or 4 pps), due to the large and
irregular behavior of the price response in the very ﬁrst quarter.
The post-1980 sample in the US includes two possibly very diﬀerent monetary regimes:
the Volcker experiment and the subsequent Volcker-Greenspan regime. The results are
robust to the omission of the Volcker experiment, 1979:4 to 1982:3.
38One important caveat: the short-term real interest rate might not be the most appro-
priate interest rate variable for this exercise. In particular, to study the response of GDP
and its components the long term interest rate might be more appropriate. The study of
the role of the long term interest rate is left for future research.
18The results are also robust to the exclusion of some years between 1973
and 197639, and to the exclusion of other speciﬁc years, motivated by stan-
dard periodizations in monetary policy (for instance, the 1979:4 - 1982:3
Volcker experiment in the post -1980 period in the US, or the 1990:4 - 1992:3
hard-ERM period in the United Kingdom).
Finally, I routinely estimate all impulse responses over the post - Bret-
ton Woods ﬂexible exchange rate period. In the interest of space, I do not
present these estimates; in general, they appear to be intermediate between
the responses of the two subsamples.
6E ﬀects on GDP components
Table 7 displays the eﬀects of government spending on GDP components.
The responses are derived from a 6 variable VAR, where each component of
GDP is added in turn to the benchmark.
The behavior of private consumption largely mimics that of GDP: it typi-
cally increases on impact, and more so in the pre-1980 sample, although only
in Australia and the United Kingdom is the diﬀerence between the impulse
responses in the two samples substantial. In the pre-1980 sample, the max-
imum eﬀect is larger than 1 in only one country, the US; in the post-1980
sample, it is never larger than .6. By quarter 12, in the post-1980 quarter the
response is either insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0, or signiﬁcantly negative.
Perhaps more informative is the cumulative consumption multiplier (the
cumulative change in consumption divided by the cumulative change in out-
put). In the post-1980 sample, by quarter 4 it is no greater than .2 , except
in the US where it is .55; by quarter 12 it has fallen further or it has remained
essentially at its quarter 4 level.40
Note that once again the US appears to be an outlier; over the whole
sample its maximum consumption response is double that of the next highest
maximum, and its cumulative consumption response is also by far the highest
at all horizons (except for West Germany at 12q u a r t e r s ) .
The private investment responses are typically more irregular, hence sum-
marizing their shapes is more diﬃcult. However, in general the response of
investment is smaller than the response of consumption; and once again the
39The exact periods I exclude are 1974:1 - 1976:4 in the US, and 1973:1 - 1975:4 in
Australia, Canada, UK and West Germany. These years are chosen on teh basis of the
size of the log change in the price level, real output, real net taxes, and real government
spending.
40Note that the consumption response is much weaker in the post-1980 period also in
Australia, where the GDP response displayed the opposite pattern.
19responses at all horizons, the maxima and minima, and the cumulative mul-
tipliers, tend to be algebraically smaller in the post-1980 period, with very
few exceptions (mostly in Australia).
In the pre-1980 sample the investment response after 12q u a r t e r si sp o s i -
tive in the USA and about 0 in all other countries; in the post-1980 sample,
at the same horizon it is signiﬁcantly negative in all countries (except Aus-
tralia), and remarkably similar — between -.7 and -.1 pp of GDP. In the ﬁrst
sample, the minima are signiﬁcantly negative in four countries, between -
.4 and -.8 pps of GDP; in the second sample, the minima are signiﬁcantly
negative in all countries, and large — between -.4 and -2.3 of GDP.
The cumulative multipliers paint a similar picture. They are much smaller
in the second sample (with the exception of Australia at quarters 12a n d2 0 ) ,
and negative after 12q u a r t e r s . 41
It is diﬃcult to detect a regular pattern in the response of exports and
imports. In general, the responses are surprisingly large, and there is some
evidence of a systematic positive response of imports. The US is once again
an exception to both statements.
7 How important is monetary policy for ﬁscal
policy? The Sims conjecture
There are two reasons why it might be important to include interest rate
and prices in a VAR with ﬁscal policy. In the Brookings comparison project
of Bryant [1988], typically small scale econometric models displayed larger
ﬁscal multipliers than large scale, rational expectation models that included
interest rate and prices (see Table 4). Sims [1988] conjectured that these
results could be explained by the presence of ﬁnancial variables, like interest
rates and prices, in the larger scale models; these jump variables embody
expectations of future changes in ﬁscal policy, and absorb some of the esti-
mated eﬀects of ﬁscal shocks. To test the Sims conjecture, I have estimated
a three variable VAR which excludes the interest rate and the GDP deﬂator.
In order not to clutter the exposition, I do not report the results, but
the pattern that emerges is clear. Both the impact eﬀects and the maximum
eﬀects of government spending on GDP are smaller in the smaller VAR, albeit
usually by very small margins, in both the whole sample and the pre-1980
sample. In the post-1980 sample, the same eﬀects tend to be slightly larger in
41Notice also the eﬀects of subsample instability: taking for instance the cumulative mul-
tipliers at 12 quarters, in three countries out of ﬁve the multipliers in the two subsamples
are on the same side of the whole sample multiplier.
20the smaller VAR, although again by very small amounts, with the exception
of the UK.
A second rationale for including the interest rate is that in its absence
ﬁscal shocks might pick up the eﬀects of interest rate shocks if there is some
systematic contemporaneous relationship between monetary and ﬁscal pol-
icy.42 The same results mentioned above speak against this interpretation.
Another way to address this issue is to reverse the ordering of the (cycli-
cally adjusted) ﬁscal policy variables and the interest rate (see also Mountford
and Uhlig [2002] for a similar exercise). In all speciﬁcations so far, cyclically
adjusted taxes and government spending could not respond contemporane-
ously to the interest rate. Suppose instead we assumed the opposite ordering.
This is conceptually inconsistent with the assumption that, because of de-
cision lags, ﬁscal policymakers cannot make discretionary changes to ﬁscal
policy in response to contemporaneous innovations in the other variables.
However, this ordering attributes as much as possible of the variation in gov-
ernment spending innovations to interest rate innovations. If the systematic
response of monetary policy to ﬁscal policy is important, one would expect
the results to diﬀer substantially now that ﬁscal shocks are forced to be
orthogonal to interest rate innovations. However, the results on the GDP
multiplier (not reported to conserve space) are very similar. In this sense,
controlling for monetary policy is not important when estimating the eﬀects
of ﬁscal policy on output — a result noted already by Mountford and Uhlig
[2002] for the US.
8T h e e ﬀects of government spending on prices
Just as the output elasticity of taxes is a crucial parameter in estimating
the eﬀects of taxes on GDP, so is the price elasticity of government spending
crucial in estimating the eﬀects of government spending on prices.43 To see
what is involved, consider a simpliﬁe dv e r s i o no ft h em o d e l
u
p = γu
g + e
p (6)
u
g = αu
p + e
g (7)
where all inessential variables and superscipts have been omitted. γ is the
eﬀect of government spending on prices; α is the elasticity of real government
spending to the price level; ut and ug are the reduced form innovations in
42Strictly speaking, this argument is relevant in a ﬂexible exchange rate regime only.
43See Blanchard and Watson [1986] for an early application of the methodology used
here.
21net taxes and government spending, and et and ep are the corresponding
structural shocks; as usual, corr(eg,e p)=0 by assumption. If not all of
government spending is indexed, α < 0. Suppose the researcher assumes an
elasticity b α diﬀerent from α. Hence, the researcher will estimate b eg = ep+(α
- b α)up,a n d
cov(b e
g,u
p)=cov(e
g,u
p)+( α − b α)var(u
p) (8)
and solving for var(up) and cov(eg,u p)
cov(b e
g,u
p)=
γ
1 − αγ
·
1+
(α − b α)γ
1 − αγ
¸
var(e
g)+
(α − b α)
(1 − αγ)2var(e
p) (9)
Thus, if γ > 0 (government spending has a positive eﬀect on prices) but
the researcher underestimates (in absolute value) the price elasticity of gov-
ernment spending, typically the estimated eﬀect of government spending on
prices will be smaller than the true one. Note also that this bias increases
with the variance of the price disturbance.
Indeed, previous VAR investigations on the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy in the
US, like Fatas and Mihov [2001] and Mounford and Uhlig [2002], have of-
ten found a negative eﬀect of government spending on prices or inﬂation.44
These results are based on orthogonalizations with real governments spend-
ing ordered before prices, thus implicitly assuming a zero elasticity of real
government spending to the price level.
Table 8 displays the results of a shock to government spending on the
price level under two alternative values for the price elasticity of the former:
0( ﬁrst three lines of each country) and -.5 (last three lines), from the same
speciﬁcation used for Table 3. Table 8 makes three important points.
First, the price elasticity of government spending does matter in the short
run: with few exceptions (and quantitatively minimal), the response at all
horizons and in all samples is larger when the elasticity is -.5 than when it
is 0. In a few countries, increasing the elasticity from 0 to -.5 changes the
qualitative conclusions from this exercise quite dramatically: in Australia
in particular, the impact eﬀect of a shock to government spending in the
pre-1980 sample changes from an implausible -1.6 percent to -.34 percent.45
44Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba [2002] also ﬁnd a negative impact eﬀect, followed by a
gradual increase. Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher [1999] ﬁnd a negative eﬀect after an
initial positive eﬀect.
45For the reasons discussed above, even -.5 might be an underestimate of the true price
elasticity of government spending. Indeed, if we assumed a price elasticity of government
spending of -1, all the negative impact eﬀects would become positive (results not reported).
Notice that these results are not a ﬁgment of the fact that the GDP deﬂator appears at
the denominator of real government spending. When government spending is deﬂated by
its own deﬂator rather than the GDP deﬂator, the results are qualitatively similar.
22However, the price elastcity of government spending makes little diﬀerence
at quarter 12.
Second, for the response of the GDP deﬂator, even more than for the GDP
response, there is evidence of considerable subsample instability. Because the
eﬀect on output is much more muted, one might expect to see a smaller eﬀect
on the GDP deﬂator in the post-80 period. This is usually the case, except
in the UK:46 even with an elasticity of -.5, no country exhibits a signiﬁcantly
positive price response at quarter 4 during this period. After 12q u a r t e r s ,
only two countries exhibit a signiﬁcantly positive response, the UK (1.13pps)
and Australia (.8 pps); in all the others, it is essentially 0.
Third, the US is, once again, an exception. It is the only country where
t h er e s p o n s eo ft h eG D Pd e ﬂator is negative after 4 and 12q u a r t e r s ;n o t i c e ,
however, that the large negative response over the whole sample estimated
here and in other works becomes much smaller in the two separate subsam-
ples.47
The eﬀects of a shock to government spending on the CPI deﬂator, instead
of the GDP deﬂator, are displayed in Table 9. The pattern that emerges is
very similar; except in Canada, in the post-1980 the CPI response appears a
bit stronger than the GDP deﬂator response, but the diﬀerence is substantial
only in West Germany.
The responses from a similar exercise, but based on a 6 variable VAR
which also includes a commodity price index, are also similar.48
9T h e e ﬀects of taxation
9.1 Eﬀects on output
Table 10a n dF i g u r e3d i s p l a yt h ee ﬀects of a shock to cyclically adjusted net
taxes equal to 1 percentage point of GDP. For each country, the table displays
the impulse responses under the benchmark output elasticity of net taxes
46Also, strictly speaking one would expect the opposite result in Australia, where GDP
increases more in the post-1980 sample.
47In fact, in all countries the response of the GDP deﬂator over the two subsamples is
considerably smaller, in absolute terms, than the response over the whole sample. In the
UK, the response of the GDP deﬂator is explosive over the whole sample, while it appears
stable over the two subsamples.
48Following much of the literature, the commodity price index is ordered ﬁrst. Results
when it is ordered last (see Sims and Zha [1998]) are very similar. It should be noted
that the reasons for controlling for a commodity price index when estimating the eﬀects
of ﬁscal policy on prices are much less compelling than when estimating the eﬀects of a
monetary policy shock.
23(ﬁrst three lines for each country), and under the same elasticity augmented
by one (next three lines).
Consider ﬁrst the results under the benchmark elasticity. The table makes
three points. First, the two countries with the largest output elasticity of
net taxes (see the last column), the US and Canada, are also the only
two countries where the impact eﬀect of taxation on output is consistently
negative in all samples, although not larger than -.25 pps. In the other
countries, the estimated impact eﬀect is always positive, and signiﬁcant.
Second, there is again evidence of stronger negative eﬀects of taxation
on GDP in the pre-1980 period than in the post-1980 one. For instance,
after 4 quarters the response of GDP is negative in all countries in the pre-
1980 period (although insigniﬁcant in Australia); in the post-1980 period it
is signiﬁcantly negative in only two countries, Canada and the UK. More
generally, at the same horizon the output response is algebraically larger in
the second subsample in four countries out of ﬁve.
Third, the tax multipliers (deﬁned as the minimum output response) are
not large: in the pre-1980 perios it is usually negative, but larger than one in
a b s o l u t ev a l u eo n l yi nt h eU Sa n di nW e s tG e r m a n y ;i nt h ep o s t - 1980 period,
i ti sb e t w e e n- . 6a n d- . 7i nC a n a d aa n dW e s tG e r m a n y ,c l o s et o0i nt h eo t h e r
countries.
The positive estimated output responses in Australia, UK and West Ger-
many are suspicious. These are the three countries with the smaller output
elasticities of net taxes (in particular, in the ﬁrst two the benchmark elastic-
ity is close to 0). As discussed, there are two reasons for this: the very small
(or zero, in the case of Australia and the UK) estimated output elasticity of
employment and employment elasticity of wages; and the zero elasticity of
corporate income taxes to its base, due to the fact that corporations can pay
quarterly installments on the basis of the previous year’s assessed tax liabil-
ity. This has a large eﬀect on the estimated output elasticity of net taxes,
given the large weight of the corporate income tax in the net tax elasticity.
Both conditions are implausible. In particular, it is likely that corpora-
tions would choose to pay quarterly installments based on expected proﬁts,
if these diﬀer greatly from the previous year’s proﬁts. For each country, the
second set of rows in Table 10 displays the impulse response of output un-
der an assumed output elasticity of net taxes equal to the benchmark value,
augmented by 1. As expected, the response of output falls algebraically at
virtually all horizons. But in Australia and in the United Kingdom it often
remains positive, or negative but stubbornly small. Reassuringly, note that
the size of the tax multiplier seems to be largely independent of the net tax
elasticity.
Thus, the evidence suggests that the eﬀects of taxation on output are not
24large; once again, the eﬀects estimated previously for the US (see e.g. Blan-
chard and Perotti [2002]) seem to be towards the high end of the spectrum.
It is interesting to relate the ranking of the tax multipliers with that of the
government spending multipliers. In the pre-1980 period, the US and West
Germany have by far the two highest tax and spending multipliers; Canada
and the UK have intermediate spending multipliers, and intermediate tax
multipliers; ﬁnally, Australia has the smallest spending and tax multipliers.
In the post-1980 period, as we have seen in most countries the response of
output to a government spending shock is mostly negative; there is indeed
a very close match between the rankings of the minimum responses to a
spending shock and to a net tax shock.
One might wonder how government spending responds to tax shocks, and
whether this could explain some of the variation in the output response, over
time and across countries. This is unlikely. Government spending never
increases more than .2 pps of GDP at any horizon and in either subsample.
The exception is West Germany, where it increases by .6 pps on impact
and by .4 pps after 4 quarters; this might help explain the positive GDP
response on impact (although note that GDP turns signiﬁcantly negative
after 4 quarters).
Table 11 reports the cumulative eﬀects of a net tax shock on net taxes
(ﬁrst three columns) and the cumulative tax multiplier (last three columns).
In general, the response of net taxes to their own shock is mush less persistent
than the response of government spending to its own shock; there is also some
more dispersion over time and across countries. Note however the very similar
cumulative response of net taxes at 4 quarters in the post-1980 period.49
9.2 Eﬀects on interest rates
Table 12 displays the eﬀects of net tax shocks on nominal and real interest
r a t e s ,a n do nt h ec u m u l a t i v ed e ﬁcit. In the whole sample, net tax shocks
have positive impact eﬀects on the nominal interest rate in three countries
(USA, Canada, and Australia), all around .2 pps, and essentially no impact
eﬀect in West Germany and the UK. But in the latter two countries, the
nominal interest rate increases signiﬁcantly after 4 quarters, while in Canada
and the US it goes back to essentiaslly 0. After 3 or more years, the interest
rate response is 0 or negative in all countries except Australia. Thus, broadly
49Note that in some cases the cumulated eﬀect on net taxes is close to zero, generating
very large net tax multipliers. In general, the cumulative tax multiplier is not as interesting
as the cumulative government spending multiplier because of the strong endogeneity of
tax revenues.
25speaking the nominal interest rate response is positive in the short run, and
negative or zero in the longer run
With the exception of West Germany after 4 quarters, the nominal inter-
est rate response in the pre-1980 period is usually algebraically smaller than
in the post-1980 period. This is consistent with the larger negative eﬀects of
net taxes on demand in the ﬁrst period.
The impact increase in the nominal interest rate in response to a tax
shock can be explained in two ways.50 First, joint tightening by ﬁscal and
monetary authorities;51 second, reverse causation: when interest income in-
creases, tax revenues from non-labor income also increase.
Note that, with the partial exception of West Germany (where as we have
seen government spending increases more), in response to a tax shock the
cumulative deﬁcit falls by very similar amounts in all countries at quarters
1 and 4, and even at quarter 12 (except that in West Germany the deﬁcit
actually increases).
9.3 Eﬀects on prices
Table 13 displays the eﬀects of a tax shock on prices. For each country
the ﬁrst three lines display the results under the benchmark price elasticity;
the next three lines under the same elasticity, less .5. In the full sample, the
impact eﬀect on prices is negative in three countries (UK, Canada, Australia),
and 0 in the others. After 4 quarters it is still signiﬁcantly negative in
Australia and Canada, and positive only in West Germany.
There is evidence of a stronger negative eﬀect of net taxes on prices in
the pre-1980 period, except in the US. This is consistent with the stronger
negative eﬀe c t so nG D Pa n dd e m a n dd u r i n gt h es a m ep e r i o d .I nt h ep o s t -
1980 period, the eﬀects of tax shocks on prices are negative but small in the
short run; after 3 years, there is some evidence of a positive eﬀect in two
countries, although only in Australia is this positive eﬀect large.
Is there a relation between the eﬀects of government spending on prices
and those of net taxes? At quarter 4, we have seen that usually the eﬀects of
government spending are insigniﬁcant; but at quarter 12, government spend-
ing shocks and net tax shocks all have eﬀects on prices of the same signs,
50As noted by Canzoneri, Diba and Cumby [2002], the increase of the interest rate in
response to a net tax shock in the US and Canada appears inconsistent with a Taylor rule,
since both output and prices also fall.
51This explanation might be consistent with the fall in the nominal interest rate in
response to a positive government spending shock that occurs in two countries in the
post-1980 period. However, only in the US does the interest reate increase in response
both to a negative government spending shock and to a positive net tax shock.
26although not always signiﬁcant.
10 Conclusions
What can account for the decline in the eﬃcacy of ﬁscal policy? First, all the
economies in the sample have become more open over time, but the increase
in the export / GDP ratio is probably too small to account for the large
changes in the government spending multipliers. Second, for more than half
of the ﬁrst period the countries of the sample were on a ﬁxed exchange rate
regime: a standard Mundell - Fleming model would predict that ﬁscal policy
is less powerful under ﬂexible exchange rates. However, there is no evidence
of a systematic crowding out of exports in the second sample. Third, the be-
havior of the monetary authorities might have changed in the second part of
the sample. Yet, in response to a ﬁscal shock the real interest rate increases
less or falls more in the second period than in the ﬁrst, except in Canada.
Fourth, credit markets have probably become more developed in the second
period, and as a consequence the share of credit constrained consumers might
have fallen. Theoretically, the ﬁscal multiplier can be larger if individuals
are liquidity constrained (see e.g. Perotti [1999]). The macroeconomic im-
portance of the relaxation of credit constraints is however far from being
well understood. Fifth, ﬁnancial markets might have reacted more strongly
in the second period, an interesting possibility that still awaits an empirical
exploration.
All these results are of course conditional on the speciﬁc methodology
used to identify the ﬁscal shocks. It is therefore important to be aware of
its potential shortcomings. The VARs used to estimate the ﬁscal shocks
have low dimensionality; to the extent that there are some important omit-
ted variables, the true one-quarter-ahead forecats error (in, say, the CBO
estimates in the case of the US), could be much smaller than the forecats
error estimated here, and the ﬁscal shocks could be misestimated. Fatas and
Mihov [2001] and Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba [2002] study the response of
macroeconomic and ﬁnancial variables to forecast revisions of the deﬁcit by
the CBO. As a related point, and as discussed in section 2.2, implementation
lags could undermine the unpredictability of the estimated ﬁscal shocks. This
is undoubtedly a danger in the methodology used in this paper. Blanchard
and Perotti [2002] show how to address this issue, under the maintained as-
sumption that ﬁscal policymakers cannot respond to output shocks for at
least two quarters, instead of one as assumed so far. They show that for the
US taking into account anticipated ﬁscal policy does not change the results
substantially. A similar exercise here would carry us far aﬁeld. However, it
27is important to note that anticipated ﬁscal policy is unlikely to undermine
what is perhaps the most interesting result of this paper — the decline in
the potency of ﬁscal policy over the last twenty years. While anticipated
ﬁscal policy might well bias the estimated impulse response downward, it is
diﬃcult to see why it should do so more in the second part of the sample.
28Appendix 1: Tax elasticities and col-
lection lags
This Appendix reports the contemporaneous tax elasticities, collection
lags, and quarter dependence for cash tax revenues. For true accrual mea-
sures of tax revenues, the tax elasticity would always be the statutory tax
elasticity, as measured by the OECD, and the notion of collection lags would
not apply.
United States
Individual income tax. (i) Income from employment: withholding system.
Contemporaneous elasticity to real earnings per person: OECD elasticity.
Collection lags: none. (ii) Income from self-employment and business: quar-
terly installments of income tax based on expected income. Contemporane-
ous elasticity to real earnings per person: OECD elasticity. Collection lags:
none.
Corporate income tax. Each corporation can have its own ﬁscal year diﬀerent
from the tax year. Large corporations are required to make quarterly install-
ment payments, of at least .8 of the tax ﬁnal tax liability. No penalty was
applied if the estimated tax liability is based on previous year’s tax liability;
this exception has been gradually phased out from 1980 on. Contemporane-
ous elasticity to tax base: 1, although it could be lower at the beginning of
the sample until the mid eighties, when a company could base its estimated
tax liability on the previous year’s tax liability. Collection lags: none.
United Kingdom
Individual income tax. (i) Income from employment and pensions: weekly
withholding during entire sample. Contemporaneous elasticity to real earn-
ings per person: OECD elasticity. Collection lags: none. (ii) Income from
self-employment: same tax rates as for income from employment (with pro-
portional surcharge). For tax year ending April 1 of year t, two lump sum
payments on January 1 and July 1 of year t, based on assessment for ﬁscal
year ending April t-1. Contemporaneous elasticity: 0.
Corporate income tax: For companies started before 1965: If the company’s
accounting period ends before March 31st of year t, the tax is due January
1 of year t+1. If the company’s accounting period ends after March 31st of
year t, the tax is due January 1st of year t+2. Hence, the lag in the pay-
m e n ti sb e t w e e n9a n d2 1 months. For companies started after 1965: the tax
is due 9 months after the end of the accounting period. Contemporaneous
elasticity: to tax base: 0.
Canada.
29Individual income tax. (i) Income from employment: withholding system.
Contemporaneous elasticity to real earnings per person: OECD elasticity.
Collection lags: none. Quarter dependence: none. (ii) Income from self-
employment and business: If an individual has less than 25% of his income
from dependent employment, required to pay quarterly installments of in-
come tax on expected income. Expected income is mostly based on previous
year’s income. Contemporaneous elasticity: 0. .
Corporate income tax. Each corporation has its own ﬁscal year. The taxa-
tion year is jan 1 to Dec 31, and covers corporations whose ﬁscal year ends
within this calendar year. Corporations must pay quarterly installments on
expected income. Contemporaneous elasticity to tax base: 1.
West Germany
Individual income tax. (i) Income from employment: withholding system.
Contemporaneous elasticity to real earnings per person: OECD elasticity.
Collection lags: none. (ii) Income from self-employment and business: quar-
terly installments of income tax based on previous year’s assessed tax liability.
Contemporaneous elasticity: 0.
Corporate income tax. Quarterly installments, based on previous year’s as-
sessment Contemporaneous elasticity to tax base: 0.
Australia
Individual income tax. (i) Income from employment: withholding system.
Contemporaneous elasticity to real earnings per person: OECD elasticity.
Collection lags: none. (ii) Income from self-employment and business: in-
stallments of income tax based on previous year’s assessed tax liability. Con-
temporaneous elasticity: 0.
Corporate income tax. Quarterly installments, based on previous year’s as-
sessment. Contemporaneous elasticity to tax base: 0.
.
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Table 1: Tax elasticities 
     
      etaxy  etaxp 
     
USA all  1.95 1.23 
 to1979  1.94 1.10 
 1980on  1.96 1.35 
     
DEU all  0.90 0.98 
 to1979  0.90 0.91 
 1980on  0.99 1.06 
     
GBR all  0.79 1.17 
 to1979  0.65 1.06 
 1980on  0.90 1.26 
     
CAN all  1.92 1.09 
 to1979  1.67 1.09 
 1980on  2.22 1.09 
     
AUS all  0.10 1.00 
 to1979  0.08 0.96 
 1980on  0.11 1.04 
        
etaxy: average elasticity of real taxes to GDPt 
etaxp: average elasticity of real net taxes to GDP 
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Table 2:  Chow tests 
     
  
Chow 
test  Pval 
USA G  1.36 0.15 
 T  2.58 0.00 
 Y  1.57 0.07 
 P  2.56 0.00 
 i  2.88 0.00 
     
DEU G  1.51 0.10 
 T  1.36 0.17 
 Y  1.18 0.29 
 P  1.42 0.14 
 i  1.41 0.14 
     
GBR G  1.76 0.03 
 T  2.32 0.00 
 Y  1.21 0.26 
 P  1.83 0.02 
 i  1.19 0.28 
     
CAN G  1.44 0.11 
 T  2.41 0.00 
 Y  2.03 0.01 
 P  1.99 0.01 
 i  1.23 0.24 
     
AUS G  1.44 0.12 
 T  2.73 0.00 
 Y  1.24 0.23 
 P  2.41 0.00 
 i  0.96 0.52 
        
The table displays the statistics from a 
Chow test on each reduced form equation, 
with the associated p-value. The test 
statistic is distributed according to the F-
distribution,  with the following degrees of 
freedom:  
USA: F(21,118); West Germany: F(21,74); 
UK: F(21,110); Canada: F(21,118); 
Australia: F(21,105) 
Breakpoint for tests: 1980:1 (Germany: 
1975:1) 
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    Table 3: Effects of G on Y   
      
      1qrt 4qrts 12qrts 20qrts max min 
    
USA all  0.43* 0.29 0.97* 0.96* 1.05*(15) 0.29(4) 
 to1979  0.73* 0.55 1.30* -0.62 1.57*(10) -0.62(20) 
 1980on  0.07 0.20 -0.53 -1.26* 0.49(3) -1.26*(20) 
    
DEU all  1.30* 0.96* -0.02 0.94* 1.30*(1) -0.27(10) 
 to1979  1.65* 1.24* 0.21 1.06* 1.65*(1) -0.18(9) 
 1980on  0.80* -0.72* -0.86 -0.71 0.80*(1) -1.55*(7) 
    
GBR all  0.30* -0.04 0.21 0.06 0.30*(1) -0.04(4) 
 to1979  0.46* -0.20 0.30 0.81* 0.91*(17) -0.20(4) 
 1980on  -0.18* -0.23 -1.30* -1.08* -0.01(3) -1.52*(15) 
    
CAN all  0.42* 0.06 0.24 0.18 0.46*(2) 0.06(4) 
 to1979  0.62* 0.01 0.81* 0.94* 0.94*(17) 0.01(4) 
 1980on  0.07 0.17 -2.23* -2.21* 0.17(3) -2.36*(16) 
    
AUS all  0.31* 0.01 0.27 0.20 0.31*(1) -0.08(3) 
 to1979  0.01 0.14 0.30 0.33* 0.51*(5) -0.31(2) 
 1980on  0.59* 0.47* 0.75* 0.62* 0.79*(14) 0.32*(3) 
                  
    
The table displays the effects on GDP of a shock to government spending equal 
to 1 percentage point of GDP. In parentheses beside the max and min response 
are the quarters at which they occur. 
Model with 5 variables: G,T,Y,P,i   
Elasticity of government spending to GDP deflator: -0.5.  
A “*” indicates that 0  is outside the region between the two one-standard error 
bands. 
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Table 4: cumulative effects of G on G; cumulative output 
multipliers 
 
     
g_cum 
 
g_cum 
 
g_cum 
 
y_cum/ 
g_cum 
 
y_cum/ 
g_cum 
 
y_cum/ 
g_cum 
 
      4 qrts  12 qrts  20 qrts  4 qrts  12 qrts  20 qrts 
         
USA all  3.55* 8.66*  10.85* 0.47  0.82  1.40 
 to1979  3.37* 6.53* 7.63* 0.87  2.08  1.85 
 1980on  2.71* 6.62* 7.52* 0.26  0.07  -1.05 
         
DEU all  3.54* 10.92*  15.50* 1.29  0.41  0.59 
 to1979  3.00* 7.39* 8.91* 1.95  0.90  1.47 
 1980on  3.99* 11.89*  15.95* 0.01  -0.86  -0.94 
         
GBR all  3.40* 7.98*  10.93* 0.20  0.29  0.30 
 to1979  3.24* 7.19* 9.64* 0.30  0.20  0.80 
 1980on  3.24* 5.67* 5.01* -0.19 -1.17 -3.52 
         
CAN all  2.94* 7.27*  10.83* 0.40  0.43  0.45 
 to1979  2.34* 5.27* 7.53* 0.76  1.23  1.83 
 1980on  2.93* 7.70* 9.76* 0.15  -1.43 -3.03 
         
AUS all  2.89* 6.20* 8.10* 0.08  0.31  0.47 
 to1979  2.18* 5.08* 5.98* -0.09  0.30  0.77 
 1980on  2.59* 5.15* 6.10* 0.68  1.28  2.03 
            
The table displays the cumulative effects on government spending of a shock to government 
spending equal to 1 percentage point of GDP (first 3 columns) and the cumulative multipliers from 
the same exercise (last  3 columns). 
Model with 5 variables: G,T,Y,P,i. 
Elasticity of government spending to GDP deflator: -0.5 
A '*' indicates that 0 is outside the region between the two one-standard error bands.  
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Table 5: Cumulative government spending 
multipliers from macroeconometric models and VARs 
    
       1qrt  4qrts  12qrts 
        
 DRI   1.53 2.05  1.86 
 EEC   - 1.18 1.10 
 EPA   1.14 1.57  1.63 
 LINK   - 1.24 1.14 
 LIVERPOOL  - 0.65 0.58 
 MCM   1.26 1.56  1.61 
 MINIMOD  1.09 1.11  0.94 
 MSG   - 0.97 0.85 
 OECD   - 1.53 1.07 
 TAYLOR  1.26 1.64  0.93 
 WHARTON  - 1.78 1.56 
       
       
 USA to1979  0.27 0.87  2.08 
  1980on 0.14 0.26  0.07 
         
 DEU to1979  0.17 1.95  0.90 
  1980on 0.35 0.01  -0.86 
         
 GBR to1979  -0.03 0.30  0.20 
  1980on 0.26 -0.19  -1.17 
         
 CAN to1979  0.01 0.76  1.23 
  1980on  -0.03 0.15  -1.43 
         
 AUS to1979  0.77 -0.09  0.3 
  1980on  -0.17 0.68  1.28 
               
 
The first panel displays the cumulative multipliers from 11 macroeconometric 
models, as displayed in Sims [1988]. The second panel displays the cumulative 
multipliers from a 5 variable VAR, as In Table 4.   
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Table 8: Effects of G on P 
    
      1qrt  4qrts  12qrts  20qrts  egcnp 
         
USA all  -0.12* -0.80* -2.08* -2.30*  0.0 
 to1979  -0.00 -0.41* -0.69* 0.24  0.0 
 1980on -0.23* -0.59* -0.26  0.03  0.0 
USA  all  -0.01 -0.55* -1.63*  -1.81*  -0.5 
 to1979  0.10* -0.27 -0.63* 0.35  -0.5 
 1980on  -0.16 -0.48* -0.17  0.07  -0.5 
        
DEU all  0.09 0.87*  1.57*  1.22*  0.0 
 to1979  0.03 0.88*  1.19* 0.73  0.0 
 1980on  0.08 0.35 -0.21  -0.44 0.0 
DEU all  0.25* 1.06* 1.72* 1.32*  -0.5 
 to1979  0.22* 1.10* 1.39* 0.91  -0.5 
 1980on  0.28 0.48 -0.23  -0.38 -0.5 
        
GBR all  -0.48* -0.12 2.11* 3.98*  0.0 
 to1979  -0.92* -0.48 -0.08 -1.00  0.0 
 1980on -0.15* 0.06 1.20* 0.28  0.0 
GBR all  -0.02 0.66* 3.24* 5.03*  -0.5 
 to1979  -0.49* 0.27  0.78 -0.29  -0.5 
 1980on  0.21* 0.26 1.13* 0.16  -0.5 
        
CAN all  -0.29* -0.23  0.41  1.26*  0.0 
 to1979  -0.21* -0.25 -0.06 1.17*  0.0 
 1980on -0.48* -0.18  0.20  -0.15  0.0 
CAN all  -0.08 0.17 0.90*  1.61* -0.5 
 to1979  -0.04 0.02 0.08 1.24* -0.5 
 1980on -0.27* 0.04  0.31 -0.11  -0.5 
        
AUS all  -0.85* -0.10 1.02* 1.66*  0.0 
 to1979  -1.60* 0.17 -0.28 -0.28  0.0 
 1980on -0.36* -0.38 0.74* 1.20*  0.0 
AUS all  -0.16 0.69* 2.09* 2.82*  -0.5 
 to1979  -0.34* 1.48* 1.25*  1.08  -0.5 
 1980on -0.21* -0.24 0.79* 1.21*  -0.5 
            
          
The table displays the effects on the GDP deflator  of a shock to government spending 
equal to 1 percentage point of GDP. 
Model with 5 variables: G,T,Y,P,i.   
The elasticity of government spending to the GDP deflator is displayed in the last 
column. A '*' indicates that 0 is outside the region between the two one-standard error 
bands.  46
 
Table 9: Effects of G on CPI 
      
      1qrt  4qrts  12qrts  20qrts 
          
USA all  0.20* -0.18 -1.94*  -2.51* 
 to1979  0.27* 0.06  -0.11  1.05* 
 1980on  0.14 -0.44  0.20  0.39 
         
DEU all  0.24* 0.96*  2.41*  2.68* 
 to1979  0.17* 0.83*  2.42*  2.55* 
 1980on  0.35 1.22* 1.28*  0.85 
         
GBR all  0.12 1.35* 4.03*  5.25* 
 to1979  -0.03 1.77*  2.58*  2.14* 
 1980on  0.26* -0.14  1.17*  0.04 
         
CAN all  0.02 -0.19* -0.40*  -0.45* 
 to1979  0.01* -0.09* -0.29*  -0.22* 
 1980on  -0.03 -0.29  0.06  -0.48 
         
AUS all  0.23* 0.78*  2.43*  3.25* 
 to1979  0.77* 1.85*  2.62*  2.73* 
 1980on  -0.17* 0.33  1.21*  1.37* 
                
          
The table displays the effects on the CPI  of a shock to government spending 
equal to 1 percentage point of GDP. 
Model with 5 variables: G,T,Y,P,i.   
Elasticity of government spending to CPI: -0.5. A '*' indicates that 0 is outside 
the region between the two one-standard error bands. 
  47
 
            
Table 10: Effects of T on Y 
            
      1qrt  4qrts  12qrts  20qrts  max  min  etaxy 
        
USA all  -0.26* -0.66* -0.69* -0.53*  -0.26*(1)  -0.75*(7) 1.95 
 to1979 -0.39* -0.78* -1.11* -0.83*  -0.39*(1)  -1.12*(13)  1.94 
 1980on  -0.17* 0.37* 0.79* -0.11  0.91*(9)  -0.17*(1) 1.96 
USA all  -0.47* -0.86* -0.76* -0.51*  -0.47*(1)  -0.88*(6) 2.95 
 to1979 -0.54* -0.80* -0.98* -0.86*  -0.34*(1)  -1.01*(14)  2.94 
 1980on  -0.49* -0.03 0.62* -0.08  0.69*(9)  -0.49(20)  2.96 
           
DEU all  0.27* -0.46* -0.51* 0.05  0.27*(1)  -0.98*(7) 0.90 
 to1979 0.29* -0.60* -0.46* -0.10  0.29*(1)  -1.16*(7) 0.90 
 1980on  0.24* -0.49* -0.21  -0.32  0.24*(1)  -0.61*(7) 0.99 
DEU all  -0.17* -0.99* -0.78* -0.22  -0.17*(1)  -1.40*(7) 1.90 
 to1979 -0.08  -1.09* -0.69* -0.37*  -0.08(1)  -1.58*(7) 1.90 
 1980on 0.01 -0.66* -0.20 -0.39*  0.01(1)  -0.66*(4) 1.99 
           
GBR all  0.06* 0.05 0.21*  0.24*  0.24*(20)  0.05(4) 0.79 
 to1979 0.05* -0.19* 0.15 -0.13*  0.15(12)  -0.19*(4)  0.65 
 1980on  0.18* 0.34* 0.05  -0.14  0.34*(4)  -0.14(20)  0.90 
GBR all  -0.04 -0.02 0.20* 0.23*  0.23*(20)  -0.04(1) 1.79 
 to1979 -0.08*  -0.26* 0.11 -0.17*  0.11(12)  -0.26*(4)  1.65 
 1980on  0.12* 0.29* 0.03  -0.17  0.29*(4)  -0.17(20)  1.90 
           
CAN all  -0.14* -0.48* -0.47* -0.06  -0.06(2)  -0.61*(8) 1.92 
 to1979 -0.18* -0.28* 0.26*  0.28*  0.28*(17)  -0.28*(4) 1.67 
 1980on  -0.12* -0.55* -0.44* -0.09  -0.09(20)  -0.67*(7) 2.22 
CAN all  -0.27* -0.57* -0.49* -0.10  -0.10(20)  -0.65*(7) 2.92 
 to1979 -0.39* -0.39* 0.19*  0.19*  0.21*(14)  -0.39*(4) 2.67 
 1980on  -0.22* -0.60* -0.37* -0.02  -0.02(20)  -0.65*(7) 3.22 
           
AUS all  0.60* 0.44* 0.13  -0.04  0.60*(1)  -0.04(20)  0.10 
 to1979 0.54* -0.09 -0.01 0.05  0.54*(1)  -0.12(3) 0.08 
 1980on  0.41* 0.55* 0.20  -0.14  0.56*(7)  -0.14(20)  0.11 
AUS all  0.38* 0.31* 0.05  -0.12  0.42*(2)  -0.12(20)  1.10 
 to1979 -0.00 -0.36* -0.17 -0.08  -0.00(1)  -0.36*(4) 1.08 
 1980on  0.25* 0.40* 0.12  -0.21  0.46*(7)  -0.21(20)  1.11 
        
        
        
The table displays the effects on GDP of a shock to net taxes equal to  1 percentage point of GDP. In 
parentheses beside the max and min  response are the quarters at which they occur.The output 
elasticities of net taxes are displayed in the last column 
Model with 5 variables: G,T,Y,P,i. Elasticity of government spending to GDP deflator: -0.5. A '*' 
indicates that 0 is outside the region between the two one-standard error bands. 
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Table 11: Cumulative effects of T on T; 
cumulative tax multipliers 
                
         t_cum  t_cum  t_cum 
y_cum/ 
t_cum 
y_cum/ 
t_cum 
y_cum/ 
t_cum    
         4 qrts 12 qrts  20 qrts    4 qrts  12 qrts  20 qrts   
                    
USA all    1.79* 1.71* 1.57   -0.88 -4.31 -7.75  
 to1979   1.27* -0.05 -2.69*    -1.75 177.92  6.58  
 1980on   2.23* 5.70*  7.81*    0.27  1.24  1.22  
                   
DEU all    3.28* 1.80* 1.36   -0.08 -3.62 -5.47  
 to1979    3.08* 0.29 -0.32    -0.22  -26.68 27.82  
 1980on    2.55* 0.93 0.85   -0.18 -4.04 -5.63  
                   
GBR all   2.18* 4.82*  6.31*    0.14  0.37  0.57  
 to1979   1.72* 1.68*  1.75*    -0.11  0.04  0.03  
 1980on   1.94* 4.22*  4.04*    0.51  0.56  0.44  
                   
CAN all    2.51* 4.72*  6.79*   -0.37 -1.14 -1.07  
 to1979   1.32* 2.57*  3.99*    -0.44  0.03  0.58  
 1980on    2.47* 2.67* 1.51   -0.41 -2.08 -4.93  
                   
AUS all   2.25* 4.33*  4.87*    0.9  1.02  0.93  
 to1979   0.67* 1.06*  1.16*    0.59  0.99  1.02  
 1980on   2.98* 7.15*  8.26*    0.6  0.72  0.59  
                             
The table displays the cumulative effects on net taxes of a shock to net taxes 
equal to 1 percentage point of GDP (first 3 columns) and the cumulative net tax 
multipliers from the same exercise (last  3 columns). 
Model with 5 variables: G,T,Y,P,i.          
Elasticity of government spending to GDP deflator: -0.5     
A '*' indicates that 0 is outside the region between the two one-standard error 
bands. 
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Table 13: Effects of T on P 
    
      1qrt  4qrts  12qrts  20qrts  etaxp 
         
USA all  0.00 -0.12  -0.74*  -1.32* 1.23 
 to1979  0.02*  0.05  0.01    -0.31*   1.10 
 1980on  -0.02   -0.27*  -0.53*  -0.13   1.35 
USA  all  0.02   -0.08   -0.67*  -1.24*  0.73 
 to1979  0.04*   0.07    0.02    -0.30*   0.60 
 1980on  -0.00   -0.24*  -0.51*  -0.12    0.85  
        
DEU all  -0.07 0.17* 0.00   -0.25  0.98 
 to1979  -0.08* 0.02    -0.68*  -0.83* 0.91 
 1980on -0.19* -0.16 -0.37 -0.29  1.06 
DEU all  -0.01  0.24*   0.05*  -0.21   0.48 
 to1979  -0.02   0.08*       -0.63*  -0.79*  0.41 
 1980on -0.16* -0.15 -0.39* -0.29  0.56 
        
GBR all  -0.17*  -0.01  0.04    0.10   1.17 
 to1979  -0.21*   -0.20*  -0.93*   -0.48*  1.06 
 1980on -0.24*   -0.16*  0.14*   0.19*   1.26 
GBR all  -0.13*   0.07  0.15   0.21   0.67 
 to1979  -0.16*   -0.12   -0.88*   -0.42  0.56 
 1980on -0.22*   -0.14*  0.14*  0.19*  0.76 
        
CAN all  -0.11* -0.31* -0.97* -1.29*  1.09 
 to1979  -0.16* -0.49* -0.41*  0.26  1.09 
 1980on  -0.08  0.11   0.22  -0.05   1.09 
CAN all  -0.07*   -0.24*   -0.89*   -1.25*  0.59 
 to1979  -0.11* -0.41* -0.37  0.28  0.59 
 1980on  -0.05 0.15 0.24    -0.05    0.59 
        
AUS all  -0.55*  -0.45*  0.05   0.29    1.00 
 to1979  -1.07* -0.80* -0.30  -0.30  0.96 
 1980on -0.19* 0.06   0.84* 0.96* 1.04 
AUS all  -0.38*  -0.25*   0.37   0.65    0.50 
 to1979  -0.77*  -0.48*  0.20    0.13   0.46 
 1980on  -0.13    0.12   0.88*   0.98*   0.54 
            
          
The table displays the effects on the GDP deflator  of a shock to net taxes  equal to 1 
percentage point of GDP. 
Model with 5 variables: G,T,Y,P,i.   
The elasticity of net taxes to the GDP deflator is displayed in the last column. A '*' 
indicates that 0 is outside the region between the two one-standard error bands. 
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 Figure 3 - Response of Y to T 
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